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Parody and the Fair Use Defense
THE BEST WAY TO PRACTICE SAFE SEX WITH ALL
YOUR FAVORITE CHARACTERS
INTRODUCTION
The Walt Disney Corporation is one of the world’s most
renowned companies; its characters (even just their silhouettes),
theme parks, and merchandise are recognizable across the globe.
Understandably, Disney is protective of its reputation, its
characters, and the wholesome values they represent. Naturally,
then, Disney takes the protection of its intellectual property
seriously, and most people would think twice before attempting
to sell a knock-off Mickey Mouse or a cake with Cinderella’s
face on it. But while a baker can’t sell a cake with the classic
Cinderella on it, she could sell one that depicts a disheveled
Cinderella slumped near a toilet with her lipstick smeared,
crown askew, and bags under her eyes. She could even have
Prince Charming’s pants strewn mischievously on the floor
nearby. Sounds perfect for a bachelorette party.
The baker’s obscene rendition of the not-so-innocent
blonde beauty is exactly that—her rendition; as such, it would
fall into the loophole—I mean defense—of parody and fair use
under both copyright and trademark law. Because Cinderella is
the epitome of purity, the hung-over version would be meant as
a humorous comment that young women are not quite as perfect
as Disney depicts them to be. Any attempt by Disney to sue for
copyright and trademark infringement would probably fail,
because since Cinderella is so widely known to be pure, no
consumer would mistake the naughty cake as a work by Disney.
While the baker’s First Amendment right to create such
a culinary masterpiece is an important one, so is Disney’s right
to exclude others from using its copyrighted materials and
tarnishing its trademarks. The sexual nature of the baker’s
rendition should receive statutory consideration in the
balancing test for fair use under copyright law because vulgar
and lewd speech is often deemed “low value” speech, and
therefore the secondary user’s First Amendment right is

1777

1778

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:4

weaker compared to the copyright owner’s right to exclude.
Currently, trademark and First Amendment law consider
content’s sexual nature when determining legality. Copyright
fair use law, however, does not. The fair use test should be
further expanded to consider the demographic of the copyright
holder’s target audience. Taken together, the lower value of the
secondary user’s First Amendment right and, in the case of a
company like Disney, the higher potential for market harm to
the copyright holder in light of the work’s sexual nature, should
weigh against fair use and be deemed infringement. The current
judicial balancing test for whether a parody or other use is indeed
fair yields inconsistent and unpredictable outcomes, often
resulting in mass media companies like Condé Nast reprinting
the images of protected characters and profiting significantly
from the sale of those images. A statutory expansion of the fair
use test would not only protect copyright holders from harmful
infringement but would also protect children from exposure to
lewd and vulgar material.
This note illuminates the current copyright fair use test’s
weaknesses and recommends additional balancing factors,
particularly within parody cases, to create a more predictable
test that reaches more consistent and equitable results1 and is
capable of distinguishing between true parody and “commercial
takeoff rationalized post hoc as a parody.”2 Part I of this note
provides a brief background of intellectual property laws and
the development of and rationale for the fair use doctrine. It
also discusses the August 2015 cover of GQ magazine, which
prominently featured some of Disney’s intellectual property
without its consent and serves as the contemporary example of
problems with copyright law and fair use. Part II delves more
deeply into copyright law and examines how courts developed
the doctrine of fair use until its codification in 1976. This part
highlights the inconsistencies in applying the fair use doctrine
to parody cases before the Copyright Amendment of 1976 and
how the Supreme Court in the seminal case, Campbell v. Acuff1 These additional factors will help create more consistency within copyright
parody cases and across intellectual property law doctrine.
2 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 600 (1994) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Some have posited that creators of parody only claim parody as a
convenient defense once sued for infringement and that these “parodists” did not have
a clear parodic intent at the time of creation. See, e.g., id. at 580 (noting that
sometimes an infringer copies a work and “merely uses [it] to get attention or to avoid
the drudgery in working up something fresh”); see generally Christopher J. Brown, A
Parody of a Distinction: The Ninth Circuit’s Conflicted Differentiation Between Parody
and Satire, 20 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 721 (2003).
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Rose, applied this doctrine. Part III discusses the inconsistent
application of the fair use test in parody cases since Campbell and
how this inconsistency has strengthened the fair use doctrine to
such an extent that copyright owners have little hope of stopping
others from using their work for substantial financial gain. Part
IV argues that by including the factors of the parody’s sexual
nature and the demographics of the original work’s target
audience in the balancing test for fair use, courts will reach more
consistent and equitable results that more appropriately protect
copyrighted works.
I.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE

A.

Types of Intellectual Property Protection and Their Goals

The theoretical justifications for intellectual property
protection vary, but it is worth discussing a few of these to
provide a more robust understanding of not just the current
laws, but also the intentions behind them. The main purpose of
intellectual property law is to encourage creativity.3 One theory
to support this rationale is that by rewarding creators with
exclusive rights to profit from their creations, the value of such
rights will incentivize creativity.4 Closely linked to this exclusive
right is the utilitarian view that the exclusion of others creates a
sustainable market in which competition is encouraged.5 Some
areas of intellectual property law embody a more Lockean labor
theory: that intellectual property rights exist because of the labor
invested in them.6 Despite the many theories supporting
intellectual property protection, the protection is often not
absolute and is balanced against society’s other interests,
including its right to freedom of expression.7
To further its goal of encouraging creativity, intellectual
property law protects intangible assets such as ideas,
depictions, words, and symbols.8 Copyright, trademark, patent,
and trade secret laws cover all intellectual property, but they
vary in the content they protect and the ways they are
3 With the generally accepted premise that creativity and advancement are
good for society. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (also known as the Progress Clause).
4 LYDIA PALLAS LOREN & JOSEPH SCOTT MILLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 3 (Ver. 4.0, 2015).
5 LOREN & MILLER, supra note 4, at 3, 298 (stating that copyright law is
generally understood to be driven primarily by utilitarian goals).
6 Id. at 3.
7 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8 LOREN & MILLER, supra note 4, at 1.
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regulated. Patent law, for example, is governed by federal
statute and prevents others from “making, using, offering [to]
sell . . . selling . . . or importing” a patented invention.9 To be
eligible for patent protection, the invention must be novel and
nonobvious.10 Once patented, another person cannot create the
invention, even if the second inventor created the object entirely
independently without knowledge of the first.11 Copyright law,
although also governed by federal statute,12 differs in this respect
by requiring that an infringer copy the protected work directly in
order to create liability for infringement.13 While copyright law
may be less strict in this regard, the protection lasts
considerably longer.14 Trademark law, by comparison, aims to
protect more than just a work, good, or service; a trademark
protects the association of a specific word, name, symbol, or
device with a particular source.15 Governed by both state and
federal law,16 trademark law prohibits the use of a mark in a
way that is likely to cause confusion or to deceive about the
source of the good17 and similarly prevents against dilution of
the protected mark.18 Although there are distinct areas of
intellectual property law, many of the assets the laws protect
fall into more than one category and thus receive overlapping
protection. Consider the iPod. Patent law protects the device’s
technology, copyright law protects the overall appearance and
individual models, and trademark law protects the word “iPod.”
Because of this overlap, it is common for an owner to bring

35 U.S.C. § 154 (a)(1) (2012).
LOREN & MILLER, supra note 4, at 4. Knowledge is not required to establish
patent infringement; for this reason, patents are very specific. On the patent
application, the patent seeker includes a precise description of the process or product to
be patented (the “claim”), and this language defines the scope of the patent. Id. at 117.
Competitors cannot recreate this exact product but could create a similar one that falls
outside the claim’s language. Id. at 116-117, 123.
11 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
12 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1301 (2012).
13 LOREN & MILLER, supra note 4, at 354-57.
14 Patents last for 20 years, while copyrights last for 70 years beyond the
death of the copyright owner. Id. at 4-5.
15 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
16 Id. §§ 1051-1127; LOREN & MILLER, supra note 4, at 461. The Lanham Act
governs federal trademark law and includes protection against dilution of trademarks.
The federal power to regulate trademarks comes from its power to regulate interstate
commerce. Because of this, an owner wishing to register a trademark on the federal
register must demonstrate use in commerce. So long as an owner can demonstrate such
use, trademarks can be renewed for 10-year periods indefinitely. 15 U.S.C. § 1051.
17 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
18 Dilution can occur through either blurring or tarnishment. Id. § 1125(c);
see LOREN & MILLER, supra note 4, at 5, 545.
9
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multiple claims of infringement in one suit.19 Due to the likelihood
of overlapping IP protection and thus overlapping IP claims,
eliminating inconsistencies between the fair use IP doctrines
should be a priority for both courts and the legislature.
B.

Fair Use as a Defense to Infringement

Many areas of intellectual property law allow some
“breathing space”20 and permit the use of protected material in
certain circumstances where the uses further scientific and
educational goals or are permitted by the First Amendment.21
Trademark and copyright law define this breathing space as
“fair use.”22 There are many types of fair use, the determination
of which is a fact-sensitive inquiry.23 Some of the more obvious
examples include a teacher photocopying worksheets for her
class, a critic quoting from a novel or movie in his review, or a
news reporter showing a clip from a local play. Under the First
Amendment, people have the right to express their opinions
and offer criticism,24 so book reviews, news reports, and movie
critiques seem like natural exceptions to intellectual property
law. The use of copyrighted materials in a classroom is also a
clear exception, as the use is in furtherance of education.25 Often,
the very theories that support prohibiting the use of trademarked
and copyrighted materials are the same theories that support
allowing others to use them. The interests of the owner and the
secondary user must be weighed against one another, but this
balancing is not always easy to implement.
One of the areas in which this balancing act has proven
legally difficult is that of parody.26 Generally speaking, parody
pokes fun at an original work by using it (usually without
19 It is also possible for an owner to bring multiple infringement claims (e.g.,
a trademark claim and a copyright claim) in a single case or controversy and see
inconsistent results across these claims. See infra Section IV.B.3.
20 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
21 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 107 (2012).
22 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (trademark fair use); 17 U.S.C. § 107 (copyright fair use).
In patent law, the concept of a “blocking patent” is supported by similar theories. Mark A.
Lemley, The Economies of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989,
991-92 (1997). An innovator is free to improve a preexisting invention and patent that
improvement. Id. The ability to patent the improvement presumably incentivized the
innovator, and society is now better off because of the improvement. Id. at 992.
23 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976). (“Indeed, since the doctrine is an
equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case
raising the question must be decided on its own facts.”).
24 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
25 17 U.S.C. § 107.
26 See infra Part II.
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authorization) and changing it to a more humorous or critical
version of itself.27 For a true parody to be successful, an artist
must take enough of the original so that his audience
recognizes the target of the parody and can understand the
point the artist is making. It follows logically, then, that a
parodist who wishes to be successful will parody (and therefore
sample from) well-known works. There are those, however, who
lack true parodic intent and will copy well-known works to gain
attention, stir up controversy, and turn a large profit.
Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to distinguish between a
parodist whose critique was intended from the start and a copier
who feigns parody after the fact. So, for example, a magazine
may take a famous character known for his etiquette and
depict him in a sexual manner in order to ridicule his rigid
conservatism, and the owner of the character’s trademark and
copyright must sit by and watch him be defiled.
C.

GQ and C-3PO: Fair Use or Abuse?

Since the release of Star Wars in 1977, the film series
and franchise are among the most well-known and successful
in the industry.28 The saga, which takes place “a long time ago,
in a galaxy far, far away,”29 appeals to fans of all ages
worldwide, in part due to the action scenes and memorable
characters, but also due to the fact that six Star Wars films
have been released since the 1977 original.30 Many of these
characters, including Princess Leia and droid C-3PO, are
registered trademarks and copyrights of Lucasfilm, now owned
by Disney.31 The August 2015 cover of GQ magazine32 featured
27 Courts struggle to define parody, but see Section II.C for a more thorough
discussion and definition.
28 As of August 25, 2015, Star Wars was the fifth-highest-grossing movie
franchise at $4.54 billion, a statistic that does not include revenue from the franchise’s
seventh film that debuted in December 2015. Natalie Robehmed, The Top-Grossing Movie
Franchises, FORBES (Aug. 25, 2015, 9:30 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/natalierobehmed/
2015/08/25/the-top-grossing-movie-franchises/ [http://perma.cc/L3VU-9HRH].
29 STAR WARS EPISODE IV: A NEW HOPE (Lucasfilm & Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp. 1977).
30 In addition to the seven major motion pictures, the franchise has released
spinoff films and a cartoon series. STAR WARS, http://www.starwars.com/ [http://perma.cc/
TMQ2-YXWW] (last visited June 28, 2016).
31 Matt Krantz et al., Disney Buys Lucasfilm for $4 Billion, USA TODAY (Oct. 30,
2012, 10:15 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2012/10/30/disney-starwars-lucasfilm /1669739/ [http://perma.cc/7LZQ-JMHK].
32 GQ is one of the many magazines owned by mass-media company Condé Nast.
About Us, CONDÉ NAST, http://www.condenast.com/about-us/about-us [http://perma.cc/
PZ8T-NYYN] (last visited June 28, 2016).
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comedian-actress Amy Schumer dressed in the very recognizable
Princess Leia bikini costume, with C-3PO’s finger in her mouth
and a provocative look on her face.33 The cover was meant to
showcase an interview with Schumer featured in the magazine
dubbing her “[T]he Funniest Woman in the Galaxy” for her
performance in the film Trainwreck.34 GQ’s choice to use words
like “galaxy” and portray Schumer as a naughty Princess Leia
alongside the Star Wars characters was presumably intended
to capitalize on the hype surrounding the release of a new Star
Wars film, The Force Awakens, in December 2015.35 In the
photos accompanying the article itself, Schumer is pictured in a
sexual act with a lightsaber and naked in bed with C-3PO and
fellow droid R2-D2.36 But Schumer was in no way associated
with Star Wars, and Disney was in no way associated with the
lewd cover image, despite the confusion these images created.37
The popularity of the Star Wars characters among children
likely contributed to the disbelief and outrage expressed by the
general public over their vulgar use.38
If Disney did not authorize the offensive use of its
characters, then how could GQ use Disney’s intellectual property
on its cover and distribute it to its audience of over seven million
people?39 The answer: parody. Apparently, GQ (and maybe
Schumer, too) was mocking the way Hollywood portrays females,
men’s obsession with Star Wars characters, and the innocent

33 Cover, GQ (Aug. 2015), http://www.gq.com/gallery/amy-schumer-photosstar-wars-trainwreck [http://perma.cc/5SGE-HC6F].
34 Chris Heath, The Force Is Strong with This One, GQ (July 20, 2015), http://
www.gq.com/story/amy-schumer-cover-story-photo-shoot [http://perma.cc/99YW-S5NZ].
35 Star Wars: The Force Awakens, LUCASFILM, http://lucasfilm.com/star-warsepisode-7-the-force-awakens [http://perma.cc/WS4C-CD97] (last visited June 28, 2016).
36 Heath, supra note 34 (photographs by Mark Seliger); Mark Seliger, Amy
Schumer Is the Funniest Woman in the Galaxy, GQ (July 20, 2015), http://www.gq.com/
gallery/amy-schumer-photos-star-wars-trainwreck#3 [http://perma.cc/H5UJ-7XC8].
37 See Emanuella Grinberg, Disney Does Not ‘Condone’ Star Wars-Themed
Amy Schumer GQ Photos, CNN (July 20, 2015, 10:45 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/
07/19/entertainment/amy-schumer-star-wars-gq-disney/ [http://perma.cc/S2E3-YH3N]
(“Some Star Wars fans took to social media to call out Lucasfilm and parent company
Disney for what they considered a ‘tasteless’ and ‘lame’ photo shoot. In response,
Lucasfilm has been issuing the following statement via its Star Wars Twitter account
over and over again. ‘Lucasfilm & Disney didn’t approve, participate in or condone the
inappropriate use of our characters in this manner.’”).
38 Disney Wants You to Know It Wasn’t Involved with GQ’s Racy Amy Schumer
‘Star Wars’ Shoot, VARIETY (July 17, 2015, 5:25 PM), http://variety.com/2015/film/news/
amy-schumer-star-wars-gq-cover-disney-lucasfilm-1201543231/ [http://perma.cc/N7QETSUW] (citing fans’ disbelief that Disney would allow this use, calling it a “shame” and
“distasteful”).
39 Media Kit, CONDÉ NAST, http://www.condenast.com/brands/gq/media-kit/
print [http://perma.cc/D6RV-68WS] (last visited June 28, 2016).
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nature of C-3PO—or so news reports have posited.40 As explained
above, it is nearly impossible to tell whether GQ truly intended to
create a parody or if it used the images to garner attention
knowing it could use the parody defense if sued by Disney. GQ’s
reliance on the fair use doctrine—despite the likelihood of
harm to Disney by prominently displaying sexualized images of
popular children’s characters, particularly when the First
Amendment provides limited protection to sexual and lewd
content—is rather disturbing. In light of such egregious
appropriation and the increased accessibility to media since the
Supreme Court decided Campbell v. Acuff-Rose in 1994,41 the
parody defense may be too strong in some circumstances. The
current balancing test employed in copyright parody42 cases
should be revisited to address the harm to copyright holders in
certain instances. If the parody is sexual and the copyright
owner’s target audience is children, the likelihood of market
harm to the copyright owner increases. In such an instance,
children may be harmed by exposure to the sexual content, but
since they cannot bring a copyright infringement suit, one way
to protect this interest is to absorb it into the balancing test for
harm to the copyright owner.
II.

COPYRIGHT LAW AND ALL ITS INCONSISTENCIES

Copyright is governed by federal statute under Congress’s
constitutional power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”43 The First Congress enacted the first set of
40 Kara Cutruzzula, May the Force Be with Amy Schumer, N.Y. TIMES (July
18, 2015), http://nytlive.nytimes.com/womenintheworld/2015/07/18/amy-schumer-gq-cover/
[http://perma.cc/Z3W8-CXYD] (noting that GQ had yet to comment on the cover).
41 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). Since 1994, technology
has improved significantly to provide ease of access to all types of media almost instantly. In
the case of the GQ cover, in addition to the images being prominently displayed in a local
store, they appeared in electronic media and by simply searching for images of C-3PO on
Google. See Josh Halliday, GQ and Men’s Health Report Biggest Sales in PPA Digital
Report, THEGUARDIAN (Feb. 14, 2013) https://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/feb/14/gqmens-health-digital-sales-abc [http://perma.cc/J2M2-7Z62] (describing GQ’s successful
digital sales and noting generally that the “emergence of tablet devices in recent years has
fundamentally changed how magazines are consumed”).
42 The defense of parody under trademark law will be briefly discussed in
Section IV.B.3, but because the characters themselves would be covered by copyright
(whereas trademark law governs the brand association between the characters and
Disney) and the copyright fair use test needs improvement, this note will focus on
copyright law.
43 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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copyright laws in 1790, and since then, the laws have been
revised in 1831, 1870, 1909, and most recently in 1976.44 The
1976 revision was partially in response to significant changes in
technology, including television and VCR tape-recording
capabilities,45 but this revision was also intended to give “express
statutory recognition” to the judicial doctrine of fair use.46 As
discussed in detail below, Congress acknowledged fair use as an
available, equitable defense to infringement and supplied the
courts with a nonexhaustive list of factors to balance when
determining whether an appropriation is indeed fair.
A.

Statutory Copyright Protection Under 17 U.S.C. § 106

Copyright law protects an author’s expression of
information, and similar to other areas of intellectual property,
this protection is nearly absolute. “Copyright does not preclude
others from using the ideas or information revealed by the
author’s work. It pertains to the literary[,] musical, graphic, or
artistic form in which the author expressed intellectual
concepts.”47 Section 106 of the Copyright Act grants copyright
owners the exclusive rights to reproduce the work, prepare
derivative works,48 distribute the work publicly, perform the
work publicly, display the work publicly, and digitally perform
the work for sound recordings.49 While these rights belong
exclusively to the owner of the copyright, they can be
transferred and licensed to others.50 Violating one of these
rights without permission results in copyright infringement.
The work need not be copied in full nor sold for profit for a
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 47-48 (1976).
Id. at 48, 51 (specifically commenting that the bill was “not intend[ed]
either to freeze the scope of copyrightable technology or to allow unlimited expansion
into areas completely outside the present congressional intent”).
46 Id. at 65.
47 Id. at 56.
48 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57 (requiring, for a
derivative work, “a process of recasting, transforming, or adapting ‘one or more
preexisting works’”). This statute has been interpreted broadly. See, e.g., Mirage
Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341, 1341 (9th Cir. 1988) (describing
copy of a work epoxied to decorative tile); Gracen v. Bradford Exchange, 698 F.2d 300,
301-02 (7th Cir. 1983) (describing hand-painted image on a plate of scene from The
Wizard of Oz). Examples of derivatives also include translations, dramatizations, motion
picture versions, and abridgments. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 169-70; see 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(2). In the case of the GQ magazine cover depicting Star Wars characters, the small
changes to the characters, if not direct copying, would certainly fall within the category of
derivative works.
49 17 U.S.C. § 106(3)-(6).
50 Id. § 201(d).
44

45
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secondary use to constitute infringement.51 Copyright infringement
has been regarded as a strict liability offense, and in instances of
willful infringement, is a criminal offense.52
To establish a prima facie case of infringement, a
plaintiff must show that he or she is the owner of a valid
copyright and that the defendant engaged in one of the acts
reserved exclusively to the owner under 17 U.S.C. § 106.53 Proof
of the second element depends on which right the defendant
allegedly violated,54 but it always requires the plaintiff to
establish that the defendant actually copied from the work and
that the copy is substantially similar to the copyrighted work.55
For example, a plaintiff’s and a defendant’s paintings may look
similar simply because the artists painted the same model, and
not because defendant copied the plaintiff’s work. If the
defendant copies only a small portion of a plaintiff’s painting, or if
the elements copied were not original enough,56 the court will
similarly find that no infringement has occurred. The enumerated
rights in the Copyright Act are, however, limited by sections 107122 of the Act.57
When Congress amended the Copyright Act in 1976, it
recognized common law fair use doctrine as “one of the most
important and well-established limitations on the exclusive
right of copyright owners” and accordingly codified the doctrine
in section 107.58 Fair use is a defense to copyright—in other
words, a use may be infringing, but if the infringement falls
under fair use, the original owner has no cause of action.
“Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair
LOREN & MILLER, supra note 4, at 364, 367, 369.
See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
§ 13.08 (rev. ed. 2010) (“Innocent intent should no more constitute a defense in an
infringement action than in the case of conversion of tangible personality. In each case,
the injury to a property interest is worthy of redress, regardless of the innocence of the
defendant.”); 17 U.S.C. § 506.
53 LOREN & MILLER, supra note 4, at 354.
54 Id. For example, if plaintiff alleges that defendant violated his right to
publicly perform the work, plaintiff will need to show that a performance occurred and
that it occurred publicly, whereas if plaintiff alleges defendant violated his right to
distribute the work, plaintiff will need to show that defendant transferred ownership of
the tangible copyrighted material. Id.
55 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903)
(“Others are free to copy the original. They are not free to copy the copy.”).
56 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); see also Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, Inc. v.
Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that “works which
express enough originality to be protected also contain material that is not original,
and hence that may be freely used by other designers,” such as works in the public
domain); see also Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 239.
57 17 U.S.C. §§ 106-122.
58 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976).
51

52
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use doctrine over and over again, no real definition of the
concept has ever emerged,” and Congress has even admitted
that since fair use is an equitable doctrine, “no generally
applicable definition is possible.”59 Congress did give some
guidance through the statute’s legislative history by providing a
nonexhaustive list of examples of potential fair use, including
excerpts of a work for comment, quotation of a passage in a
scholarly work, “use in a parody of some of the content of the work
parodied,” summaries of a work, and a teacher’s reproduction.60
The history of the amendment only mentions parody in
the list of examples that the court “might regard” as fair use,
and parody, just like any other potential fair use, must be
deemed fair based on the four-factor balancing test. The statute
expressly instructs courts that
[i]n determining whether the use made of a work in any particular
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.61

Along with these factors is the statutory caveat that although
they may “provide some [gauge] for balancing the equities,” the
factors are “in no case definitive or determinative” of fair use.62
Congress also acknowledged that each case would be unique,
and therefore no exact rule or formula is practical; all Congress
felt it could do was endorse the doctrine and provide some
guidelines. “[T]here is no disposition to freeze the doctrine . . . .
[T]he courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular
situations on a case-by-case basis.”63 With the official sanction
from Congress, courts continued to freely adapt the doctrine,
resulting in an inconsistent application of fair use, particularly
regarding parody.
59
60
61
62
63

Id.
Id. at 65-66.
17 U.S.C. § 107.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65.
Id. at 66.
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Courts’ Development of the Fair Use Doctrine

Because section 107 explicitly established the judicial
role in the realm of fair use, courts continued to build on their
previous fair use analyses, which were generally inconsistent
within and among the circuits. For this reason, it is important
to look back at parody cases decided both before and after the
1976 Copyright Act in order to get an understanding of the
doctrine and to determine where some wiggle room remains.
Interestingly enough, the cases prior to 1976 do not agree on
whether parody may be considered a fair use. In Benny v.
Loew’s Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that the defendants infringed
an author’s copyright of the film Gas Light by producing the
television parody “Auto-light,” stating that parody should not be
treated differently from any other taking.64 In other words, parody
was not a legitimate defense.
The Second Circuit found differently in Berlin v. E.C.
Publications, where defendant Mad Magazine had parodied
several of the plaintiff’s songs. The court held that parody is
“deserving of substantial freedom,” particularly when “it is
clear that the parody has neither the intent nor the effect of
fulfilling the demand for the original, and where the parodist
does not appropriate a greater amount of the original work
than is necessary to ‘recall or conjure up’ the object of his
satire.”65 In 1975, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York used this “conjure up” test and found
infringement in Walt Disney Productions v. Mature Pictures
Corp.66 There, the court held that the use of the “Mickey Mouse
March” during a sexually explicit scene in the pornographic
film The Life and Times of the Happy Hooker was not fair use
despite the defendant’s argument that the use of the song was
a parody because it was “merely a ‘humorous take-off’ on the
music” and did not target the song, but life in general.67 The
court also commented that the use of the song in the “setting
64 Benny v. Loew’s Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956); see Brief for Petitioner,
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Loew’s Inc., 1957 WL 87600, at *5 (No. 90).
65 Berlin v. E.C. Publ’ns, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964). Implicit in the
idea of parody is that a parodist is mocking the original work, so the parodist must take
something from the original so that the audience knows who or what the target of the
parody is.
66 Walt Disney Prods. v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1397
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
67 Id. at 1398. The court emphasized that defendants took more than was
necessary by repeating the song throughout the film and that while “defendants may
have been seeking in their display of bestiality to parody life, they did not parody the
Mickey Mouse March but sought only to improperly use the copyrighted material.” Id.
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provided” would “immediately compromise the work,”68
suggesting that the sexual nature of the setting weighed against
fair use. It was amidst this series of inconsistent cases that
Congress amended the Copyright Act, making it clear that fair
use, in some instances parody, was an equitable defense to
copyright infringement.69
After the amendment, courts continued to inconsistently
apply the fair use doctrine, weighing some factors heavily while
blurring others. Particularly, courts seemed to disagree as to
whether a work is transformative, how much a parody may take
from an original work, and how necessary it is that the parody
comment directly on the work it steals from versus commenting
on society more generally. In 1978, in Walt Disney Productions
v. Air Pirates, the Ninth Circuit determined that the use of
Disney characters in a cartoon depicting them as “active
members of a free-thinking, promiscuous, drug-ingesting
counterculture” was not fair use because the defendants
appropriated more of the work than was necessary.70 The court
qualified the holding in Benny and seemed to adopt the
“conjure up” test used in Berlin as a limitation on how much of
the original work could be used.71 Importantly, the court was
skeptical of the defendant’s motives, insinuating that the
defendant’s true intent was to track his work as close to
Disney’s as possible in order to gain attention.72 The court did
not consider the effect of the parody on the market but did
contend, in dicta, that parody may be a critique on society in
general, as opposed to a critique on the copyrighted work, but
then the need to use the specific characters would diminish.73

Id.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
70 Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 753, 757 (9th Cir. 1978)
(quoting Note, Parody, Copyrights and the First Amendment, 10 U.S.F. L. REV. 564,
571, 582 (1976)).
71 Tyler T. Ochoa, Dr. Seuss, the Juice and Fair Use: How the Grinch Silenced
a Parody, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 546, 575 (1997); see Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at
757-58 (“[G]iven the widespread public recognition of the major characters involved
here, . . . very little would have been necessary to place Mickey Mouse and his image in
the minds of the readers.”).
72 Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 758. This rationale seems to indicate that the court
considered the possible commercial advantage of using Disney characters.
73 Id. A balance between the copier’s First Amendment right and copyright
owner’s right to his expression “has been struck at giving the parodist what is
necessary to conjure up the original, and in the absence of a special need for accuracy
that standard was exceeded.” Id. (citations omitted). In other words, if the critique was
general to society, the defendant would not need to copy so much and so specifically
from the original work to make his point.
68
69
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In Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., the
Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that even
though Saturday Night Live’s parodied use of “I Love New
York” in “I Love Sodom” was a critique on society in general,
the threshold question was whether the use was a valid parody
at all.74 Holding that the use was a valid parody, the court
found it to be a fair use because it did not fulfill the market
demand for the original song.75 Only a year later, however, the
Second Circuit changed course on whether a parody must
comment on the original.76 In 1981, the Second Circuit held
that an off-Broadway play’s song, “The Cunnilingus Champion
of Company C,” infringed on “The Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy of
Company B” by using the original’s tune but exchanging the
lyrics for ones much more sexual and explicit.77 The Second
Circuit held that the parody must at least comment on the
parodied work and can, in addition, comment on society in
general.78 Notably, the court expressed its disgust at the
obscene nature of the parody, stating, “We are not prepared to
hold that a commercial composer can plagiarize a competitor’s
copyrighted song, substitute dirty lyrics of his own, perform it
for commercial gain, and then escape liability by calling the
end result a parody.”79 In dissent, Judge Mansfield strongly
disagreed, stating that since the parody did not replace the
market demand for the original song, regardless of how much
of the original work was copied, the use was fair.80
In 1986, the Ninth Circuit gave the fourth factor some
much-needed attention when it decided Fisher v. Dees.81 In Fisher,
the court ruled in favor of an alleged infringer whose song “When
Sunny Sniffs Glue” parodied the popular song “When Sunny Gets
Blue.”82 The court agreed with Air Pirates and MCA that
parody deserves protection only if the copied work is the target
74 Elsmere Music Inc. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 746 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff’d, 623 F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir. 1980); Ochoa, supra note 71, at 577-78.
75 Elsmere Music Inc., 482 F. Supp. at 747.
76 The Ninth Circuit in Air Pirates determined that the parody may target
society in general, not just the intellectual property used, which differed from the
district court’s holding. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 758; Walt Disney Prods. v. Mature
Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The Second Circuit weighed in on
this “target” component in Elsmere, agreeing with the Ninth Circuit that society can be the
parody’s target, but then in MCA stated that while society can be the target, the work
parodied must also be targeted. Elsmere Music Inc., 482 F. Supp. at 746-47.
77 MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 182, 185, 187 (2d Cir. 1981).
78 Id.; see Ochoa, supra note 71, at 547 & n.186.
79 MCA, 677 F.2d at 185.
80 Id. at 190-91 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
81 Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986).
82 Id. at 434, 440.
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of the parody to some extent, but it disagreed that the copied
material must be limited to that which is necessary to “conjure
up” the original.83 The Fisher decision aligned with Judge
Mansfield’s dissent in MCA but marked a departure from the
“conjure up” test used in Berlin and Air Pirates. Amidst all of this
inconsistency, and nearly 20 years after the 1976 Copyright Act
amendment, the Supreme Court addressed parody as fair use for
the first time in 1994 in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose.84
C.

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose

Decided by a unanimous Court in 1994, Campbell v. AcuffRose Music, Inc. is the only Supreme Court case to consider
whether parody is a sufficient defense to copyright infringement
under section 107.85 In Campbell, Acuff-Rose Music filed suit
against 2 Live Crew, claiming that 2 Live Crew’s rap song “Pretty
Woman” infringed its copyright for the rock song “Oh Pretty
Woman” by using the same opening line and changing the
remaining lyrics to more shocking ones that were still reminiscent
of the predictable lyrics of the original work.86 2 Live Crew
asserted that their version was a parody and that the similarity to
the original work was intentional, meant to “ridicule the whitebread original” and remind the listener “that sexual congress with
nameless streetwalkers is not necessarily the stuff of romance
and is not necessarily without its consequences.”87 The district
court held that the parody was fair use, but on appeal, the Sixth
Circuit held that the commercial nature of the parody rendered

Id. at 438.
The Supreme Court did rule on fair use in Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), and Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985), but did not rule on parody until Campbell.
The Supreme Court did consider parody in Benny v. Loew’s Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir.
1956), aff’d sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Loew’s, Inc., 356 U.S. 43
(1958) (per curiam), but due to an equally divided Court, never issued an opinion.
85 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (“We thus line
up with the courts that have held that parody, like other comment or criticism, may
claim fair use under § 107.”). Although the Supreme Court had previously considered
fair use, this was the first time it considered parody as a specific type of fair use under
section 107. Id.; Ochoa, supra note 71, at 571-76 (stating that the Court considered and
rejected parody as a fair use defense in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., but this
was prior to Congress passing section 107); William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair
Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
667, 671 (1993).
86 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 572-74 (1994).
87 Id. at 582 (citing Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1442
(6th Cir. 1992) (Nelson, J., dissenting)).
83
84
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the use infringement.88 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether parody could be considered fair use under
section 107, how to use the statute’s four factors to determine fair
use, and whether the commerciality of a parody causes a
presumption of infringement.89 Ultimately, the Supreme Court
ruled that the parody was a fair use.
1. Campbell’s Analysis of the Four Fair Use Elements
In Campbell, the Court began by recounting that the
Copyright Act’s purpose, found in the U.S. Constitution, was
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”90 and
noted that “[f]rom the infancy of copyright protection, some
opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has been
thought necessary to fulfill [this] very purpose.”91 The Court
quoted Justice Story and other scholars who have acknowledged
that very little creation is truly new, and in the interest of
promoting art and science, people naturally are inspired by or
build upon the works of others.92 With the stage set for fair use as
an established and necessary defense to copyright infringement,
the Court emphasized that the test for whether a work is fair use
is not a bright-line rule, but rather is fact sensitive and requires
an equal balancing of all four factors.93 The Court also expressly
acknowledged that parody falls within section 107’s meaning of
fair use because parody, “[l]ike less ostensibly humorous forms
of criticism, [ ] can provide social benefit, by shedding light on
an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new one.”94
In reversing the Sixth Circuit’s decision, the Supreme
Court analyzed and balanced the four factors of fair use de novo,
beginning with the first prong of the fair use test, which analyzes
“the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational

88 Essentially, the Court of Appeals felt that the overwhelmingly commercial
nature of the song, which sold nearly a quarter of a million copies, was dispositive of
the fair use claim, and it did not consider the remaining three balancing factors in its
decision. Id. at 573-74.
89 Id. at 574.
90 Id. at 575 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
91 Id.
92 Id. (citing Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No.
4436)).
93 Id. at 577 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 560 (1985)).
94 Id. at 579.
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purposes.”95 Because the very nature of parody is to “shed light on
an earlier work,” it requires taking parts—in some cases large
parts—of a previous work in order to create that commentary.
Often this factor of creating commentary, the “character,” is
analyzed by questioning whether or not the work is
“transformative.”96 However, if
the commentary has no critical bearing on the substance or style of the
original composition, which the alleged infringer merely uses to get
attention or to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh, the
claim to fairness in borrowing from another’s work diminishes
accordingly (if it does not vanish), and other factors, like the extent of
its commerciality, loom larger.97

In other words, if the work is not transformative and seems to
only have copied the original due to lack of effort, then the claim
of infringement seems more likely.98 The Court did make it clear
that while a lack of transformation could make the fair use
defense vanish entirely, it alternatively might just diminish it
and thrust more importance onto the remaining three factors.99
The balancing of these factors is important because under the
statute, parody can be a fair use, but just like any of the other
listed fair uses, not all parody is fair use.100 Similarly, the
Supreme Court held that the commercial or nonprofit aspect of
the first factor is only one element in evaluating whether the
work is fair use and that the Sixth Circuit erred when it held
that the commercial use of 2 Live Crew’s song was essentially
dispositive of their defense.101
The Supreme Court also found error in the circuit court’s
reasoning that the amount of the original song that 2 Live Crew
95 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012). The “purpose and character” prong includes,
among other aspects, how transformative the new work is and whether its purpose is
educational, commercial, critical, etc.
96 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (citing Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use
Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990)).
97 Id. at 580.
98 When an alleged infringer only adds a sexual component to the original
work, it is likely done for attention and to leech off the original artist’s creativity. The
sexual gloss added by the secondary user is arguably not transformative enough to
meet this criteria. See Elsmere Music, Inc. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 746
252 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
99 Later, the Ninth Circuit in Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA,
Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997), seemed to exploit the “transformative” requirement.
100 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 581.
101 Id. at 584. The Court dispensed with the second factor rather quickly,
explaining that the second factor only recognizes that “some works are closer to the
core of intended copyright protection than others,” and this factor is rarely helpful in
“separating the fair use sheep from the infringing goats in a parody case, since
parodies almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive works.” Id. at 586.
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had taken was excessive and therefore unfair.102 “Parody’s
humor . . . necessarily springs from recognizable allusion to its
object through distorted imitation. . . . When parody takes aim at a
particular original work, the parody must be able to ‘conjure
up’ at least enough of that original to make the object of its
critical wit recognizable.”103 In other words, the parody will
likely need to take the “heart of the work” in order for the
audience to recognize it, and infringement will depend on how
much more, beyond what was necessary, was taken.104
The Court again found error in the Sixth Circuit’s
analysis of the fourth factor: market harm. The type of market
harm contemplated under section 107(4) includes both harm to
the market for the original and harm to the market for
derivative works.105 Parody, by its nature, aims to criticize
original work and therefore may have an adverse effect on the
original’s demand (consumers may have a subconscious or
actual aversion to the original as a result of the parody), but
this type of market harm does not lead to infringement.106
“[T]he role of the courts is to distinguish between ‘[b]iting
criticism [that merely] suppresses the demand [and] copyright
infringement[, which] usurps it.’”107 Infringement occurs when
the copied work takes the place of the original in a current or
potential market.108 Those asserting the parody defense109 must
show that there is no harm to the market for the original—and
harm is often unlikely because parody generally targets a
different audience—and that the parody does not harm any
potential markets, here the market for a rap version of “Oh

102 This seems to resolve the debate between the Second and Ninth Circuits
about the amount necessary to conjure up the original. See supra Section II.B.
103 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588.
104 See id. at 589. The Court described the copying in this case as not one in
which “the parody is so insubstantial, as compared to the copying, that the third factor
must be resolved as a matter of law against the parodists.” Id. This begs the question,
of course, how much is too much?
105 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1976); Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (explaining the
application of the fourth factor).
106 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592.
107 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th
Cir. 1986)).
108 Id. Because copyright holders also have rights to derivative works, there may
be potential markets that do not yet exist because the derivative does not yet exist. For
example, a copyright owner of a novel would be able to prevent someone from creating a
film version, because the existence of the film would harm the novel’s potential market in
the film industry. If the film existed, consumers would not want to view a second film
created by the novel’s copyright owner; the place in the market would have been usurped.
109 Id. at 590 (stating that fair use is an affirmative defense asserted by the
alleged infringer).
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Pretty Woman.”110 Ultimately, the Court remanded the case,
and the parties reached a settlement that allowed 2 Live Crew
to obtain a license from Acuff-Rose.111 The Court’s application of
the market harm factor favors the parodist who can claim the
two works are not competing in the same target market;
therefore, the test does not adequately protect a copyright owner’s
concerns about market consequences. This case solidified fair
use’s protections of parody, potentially to a fault. Campbell allows
a defendant to take another person’s song, change only the
lyrics,112 and sell the “new” song for profit, so long as the target
audience is different from the original song’s. As such, the
holding rewards melody theft and allows lazy songwriters to
leech off the success of others.
2. The Parody Case Did Not Define “Parody”
The Court’s emphasis in Campbell was on determining
whether the use presented was fair using the balancing factors,
but it refused to evaluate the artistic quality of the parody. It
quoted Justice Holmes in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing
Co. to reiterate the view that “[i]t would be a dangerous
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of [a work], outside of the
narrowest and most obvious limits.”113 Apparently, Supreme
Court Justices can judge countless other matters, but cannot
pass judgment on works of art. By refusing to evaluate the
parody itself, the Court declined to consider policies and
concerns associated with fair use and free speech that it has in
other related areas of the law, particularly with regard to
sexual and lewd content.114 As discussed in Section IV.B.2, the
Supreme Court and various lower courts have defined and
evaluated the sexual nature of works to determine the level of
First Amendment protection these works deserve and thus
were capable of evaluating the sexual nature of 2 Live Crew’s
rendition. The Court could have considered whether the lyrics
were lewd enough to diminish 2 Live Crew’s right to this type
of expression and whether children would be exposed to the
Id. at 593.
Id. at 594; LOREN & MILLER, supra note 4, at 403.
112 Note that only the lyrics of “Pretty Woman” and “Oh Pretty Woman” were
changed; the tune and even the topic of the two songs are the same.
113 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582 (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing
Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251(1903) (alterations in original)).
114 See infra Section IV.B.2.
110
111
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sexual parody. If, due to either the original’s popularity or the
reach of the parodied version, it was likely that children would
be exposed to vulgarity, then 2 Live Crew’s First Amendment
rights would diminish further while market harm to Acuff-Rose
and harm to juvenile listeners would increase. On balance
then, Acuff-Rose’s right to prevent such an appropriation would
prevail. For all this “sensitive balancing of interests”115 and
concern with the improvement of society, the Court ignored
many of the other competing interests considered by the circuit
courts, leaving certain questions unresolved.116
III.

A POST-CAMPBELL WORLD

A.

Inconsistent Applications of Campbell: The Cat NOT in
the Hat!, The Wind Done Gone, and Spaceballz

Just three years after Campbell, the Ninth Circuit in
Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books USA Inc. ruled that
Penguin Books’ O.J. Simpson-themed adaptation of The Cat in
the Hat, The Cat NOT in the Hat!, was not a fair use.117 Despite
the imitation of Dr. Seuss’s characteristic rhyme scheme and
the defendant’s claim that the book parodied the Cat’s seemingly
benign antics by comparing them to Simpson’s legal tricks in
court to show how defying authority may harm others, the
court did not accept the argument. Instead, the court called it
“pure shtick” and described the “post-hoc characterization of
the work” as “completely unconvincing.”118 Although the Campbell
Court echoed Justice Holmes’s recommendation in Bleistein that
courts refrain from evaluating the artistic merit of a work, the
Ninth Circuit opined on that very issue. By calling the argument
“pure shtick,” the court questioned the parody’s artistic value
and indicated its disbelief that the defendant’s motive was to
incorporate a critique of The Cat in the Hat.119 The court was
115 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 n.40 (1984)).
116 Many of the parodies where the parody was sexual in nature and the
original work targeted families or children were held to be infringing, yet the sexual
nature and type of audience were not addressed in Campbell. See MCA, Inc. v. Wilson,
677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.
1978); Walt Disney Prods. v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
see also supra Section II.B.
117 Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th
Cir. 1997).
118 Id. at 1403.
119 The harsh critique of the defendant’s argument shows that the court
questioned the parodic nature of the work in general and saw the use as a blatant rip-
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also concerned that the defendant took more of the original work
than was necessary and that the parody would cause harm to the
potential market for derivative works.120 Without going into
much detail, the court held that the likelihood of market
substitution was enough to weigh against the defendants.121
In 2001, the Eleventh Circuit held in Suntrust Bank v.
Houghton Mifflin Co. that Alice Randall’s novel, The Wind Done
Gone,122 which copied the famous storyline from Gone with the
Wind, was fair use.123 Randall “appropriated the characters, plot
and major scenes” from Gone with the Wind in her novel but
claimed that it was a critique of the original’s “depiction of
slavery and the Civil-War era American South.”124 The district
and circuit courts both relied on Campbell but arrived at
different conclusions: while the district court held that The
Wind Done Gone was not a parody at all, the circuit court held
that the criticism was a parody and that Houghton Mifflin had
a fair use defense.125 One rather shocking result from the
Eleventh Circuit’s finding of fair use, as one scholar points out,
is that it eliminated “any requirement that parody include
humor and broadened the definition of parody beyond that
provided in Campbell.”126 According to the Suntrust court, all a
work needed to do to qualify as a parody was to comment or
criticize the original for an artistic purpose, as opposed to a
scholarly or journalistic reason.127 This enlarged the doctrine to
encompass almost any unauthorized use where the user could
claim the material was taken in the name of art.
In 2002, Lucasfilm sued the distributors of Spaceballz, an
animated pornographic film based on Star Wars, for both
off of the Dr. Seuss classic that attempted to capitalize on the original work’s notoriety.
The court also believed that the characterization of the work as a parody only occurred
after its creation in an attempt to fit within the fair use defense. Id.
120 Id.; Ochoa, supra note 71, at 589.
121 Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d at 1403. Recall that under 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), a
copyright gives its holder the right to derivative works. Here, the court found that The
Cat NOT in the Hat! could fulfill the place in the market for The Cat in the Hat
derivative works, which belonged to Dr. Seuss Enterprises. Id.
122 ALICE RANDALL, THE WIND DONE GONE (2001).
123 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1276-77 (11th
Cir. 2001).
124 Id. at 1259.
125 Id. at 1272, 1276-77 (“We reject the district court’s conclusion that
Suntrust has established its likelihood of success on the merits. To the contrary, based
upon our analysis of the fair use factors we find, at this juncture, TWDG is entitled to a
fair-use defense.”).
126 Barbara S. Murphy, The Wind Done Gone: Parody or Piracy? A Comment
on Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Miffin Company, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 567, 594 (2002).
127 Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1268-69.
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trademark and copyright infringement.128 Without conducting an
in-depth analysis of the factors, the Second Circuit refused to
issue an injunction against the defendant and cited both
Campbell and Dr. Seuss to rule that the film was a parody of
Star Wars because it “broadly mimics an author’s characteristic
style and holds it up to ridicule” and thus may constitute fair
use.129 It seems that even after Campbell, courts continue to apply
the balancing test inconsistently, sometimes straying quite far
from precedent. While some circuits, like the Ninth Circuit in
Dr. Seuss, rightly question the work’s underlying parodic
nature, circuits like the Eleventh and Second are expanding the
precedent in generous, even dangerous, ways. The uncertainty of
the parody test may prevent copyright owners from bringing suit
when their works are used and exploited by others.130 While
copyright is intended to promote science and creativity, the fair
use defense sometimes promotes “pure shtick,” instead.
B.

Could Disney Win Now?

In light of these inconsistencies, if Disney were to bring
a suit against GQ alleging infringement for the use of Princess
Leia and C-3PO on its magazine cover, it is not clear whether
Disney would prevail. GQ could claim the use of the characters
was a fair parody, triggering the precarious balancing test.
Under the first factor (the purpose and character of the work),
the critical nature of the parody seems to weigh in favor of fair
use, but the use of C-3PO on the cover only months before the
release of a new Star Wars film shows that the use was highly
commercial, weighing against fair use.131 One could also see the
work as a source of information and entertainment that tips
the scale in favor of fair use. But is the use transformative?
Maybe. The images of the characters are identical to the ones
128 Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Grp., Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 899 (N.D.
Cal. 2002). In 1987, Brooksfilms and MGM made the parody film Spaceballs, a
nonpornographic parody of Star Wars. Spaceballs, IMDB (Apr. 21, 2016, 10:00 AM),
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0094012/ [http://perma.cc/XE9X-B5EG]. Director Mel Brooks
gained George Lucas’s consent prior to filming. Josh Rottenberg, Mel Brooks Looks Back on
‘Spaceballs,’ ENT. WKLY. (Aug. 3, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.ew.com/article/2012/08/03/
mel-brooks-looks-back-spaceballs [http://perma.cc/4GY8-6ZW4]. The suit against Media
Market Group over the pornographic parody indicates that the parody’s sexual nature
was a concern to copyright holders.
129 Lucasfilm Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d at 901.
130 Another shocking aspect of this fact is that if deep-pocket copyright owners
like George Lucas and the Mitchell estate cannot be successful in these cases, then it
becomes more likely that a humble owner will not even attempt to bring a claim at all.
131 See infra Section IV.B.1.
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used elsewhere and have only been placed in a somewhat
sexual position, with Amy Schumer and the surrounding
setting doing much of the work to create the sexual gloss.132
Looking to the second factor, the nature of the Star Wars
copyrighted work is creative, but as Justice Souter pointed out
in Campbell, this factor is not very helpful in determining fair
use or infringement.133
The third factor, the amount of the copyrighted work
taken, does not seem to be so straightforward. Would a court care
that GQ only used C-3PO on the cover?134 That it only used his
upper torso? That his image is an exact photo, not a sketch
altered in any way? That the use of multiple characters’ images
appeared in only one article within one issue of the magazine?
Often, in the case of parody, this third factor allows for extra
“breathing space” and permits a larger taking to be deemed fair.135
The fourth factor too presents some issues. Would a court
define the market as one for sexual parodies of the Star Wars
characters—a market that, clearly, Disney would not pursue? Or
would a court view it as the market for magazine covers? The
uncertainty surrounding the balancing test compared to the
certainty of negative publicity136 and the risk of developing
unwanted precedent137 most likely weigh in favor of Disney not
bringing suit, which highlights how strong the fair use doctrine
has become138 and the need to tame it, or at the very least,
improve its predictability.

Cover, supra note 33.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
134 It is also possible Disney could argue that GQ “used” Princess Leia by dressing
Amy Schumer in one of the Princess’s well-known costumes.
135 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (permitting a full song to be parodied); Elsmere
Music Inc. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.1980) (similarly finding the parodied
version of a copyrighted song to be fair use where the tune was kept the same and only the
lyrics were changed).
136 See Eriq Gardner, Disney Sues over Musical Featuring ‘Spider-Man,’ ‘Mary
Poppins’ and ‘The Lion King,’ HOLLYWOOD REP. (Sept. 26, 2013, 10:09 AM), http://www.
hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/disney-sues-musical-featuring-spider-637362 [http://perma.c
c/LL42-NE4K]; Kristy Puchko, Disney Sues over Mockbuster Frozen Land, CINEMABLEND
(Dec. 30, 2013, 12:54 PM), http://www.cinemablend.com/new/Disney-Sues-Over-MockbusterFrozen-Land-40897.html [http://perma.cc/CK4R-D8QH].
137 If a court were to hold that the use was fair, this might seem to give license
to others to use Disney’s works so long as they are parodied in some slight way.
138 Because parody has become such a strong defense to infringement, GQ is
allowed to copy and use the exact image of the Star Wars characters in its magazine
without Disney’s consent and despite any confusion or harm such use creates. See
supra note 35 and accompanying text.
132
133
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IV.

ADDITIONAL FACTORS TO CONSIDER WHEN BALANCING:
THE CRITERIA ARE NOT “DEFINITIVE OR
DETERMINATIVE”

A.

Theoretical Basis for Considering Other Factors

In the very first U.S. case to address fair use, Justice
Story began the opinion by expressing how difficult such cases
are: “This is one of those intricate and embarrassing questions,
arising in the administration of civil justice, in which it is not,
from the peculiar nature and character of the controversy, easy
to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion, or to lay down any
general principles applicable to all cases.”139 Later, Judge Learned
Hand described fair use as “the most troublesome issue in the
whole law of copyright.”140 Congress acknowledged this same
difficulty when it codified section 107 in 1976, by explaining
that defining fair use is an impossible task and that Congress
can best serve the courts by providing a flexible framework
with suggested balancing factors.141 Congress made it clear that
the four balancing factors were not definitive or determinative
and instead were provided as a gauge to balance the equities of
the two parties142 and the “fundamental public policies at
stake.”143 As William Patry and Shira Perlmutter have argued,
“Flexibility and sensitivity . . . are essential to [fair use’s]
successful functioning.”144 Thus it is clear that the doctrine of
fair use not only has the flexibility to consider additional
factors but was intended to do so. It has also been argued that
the parody defense has grown too strong and no longer fairly
balances competing interests but instead “permit[s] blatant ripoffs of valuable intellectual property . . . [and] erod[es] the
economic incentive to create intellectual property.” This “in
turn, is hampering, not helping the free flow of ideas,”145 in
direct contrast to the purpose behind fair use. Including
additional factors in the balancing test is not only allowed
under the statute and the doctrine, but is also necessary to rein
in the parody and fair use defenses.
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per
curiam); see Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 85.
141 See supra Section II.A.1.
142 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976).
143 Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 85, at 668.
144 Id.
145 Schuyler Moore, What’s So Funny About Parody?, 11 UCLA ENT. L. REV.
21, 21 (2004).
139

140
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A Vote for Sex (as an Additional Balancing Element)

As discussed in Section I.A, intellectual property requires
unique protection due to its intangible nature and the importance
of encouraging progress in science and education. The Framers of
the U.S. Constitution believed that Congress needed the power
to grant authors exclusive rights in their writings to achieve
progress as a society.146 The fair use doctrine “permits . . . courts
to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on
occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is
designed to foster.”147 This understanding seems to beg the
question: What is that “very creativity”? Courts refuse to define
art148 and thus refuse to define this “creativity” of society that
needs to be balanced against an author’s exclusive copyright.
While “art” will likely remain undefined by the courts, the
Supreme Court and Congress have determined that in some
circumstances, sexual and lewd material does not deserve full
legal protection.149 By carrying this rationale into copyright law,
cases could be resolved more consistently within copyright law
and between copyright and trademark claims.150 Given the
commonness of lewd parodies,151 the shocking and often insulting
effect they have on audiences, the competing “fundamental public
policies” on sexual material,152 and the tendency of some judges to
include the parody’s sexual nature in their analysis, the parody’s
sexual nature should be one of the statutory factors weighed in
the balancing test.

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also LOREN & MILLER, supra note 4, at 298.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (quoting
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)).
148 See supra Section II.C.2.
149 See infra Section IV.B.2.
150 As discussed in Section I.A, supra, many intellectual property assets
receive overlapping coverage from the various means of intellectual property
protection, and frequently, plaintiffs bring copyright and trademark claims together. If
a copyright infringement claim is brought with a trademark dilution or tarnishment
claim, as discussed in Section IV.B.3, infra, a court will examine the sexual nature of
the alleged violation in determining the merit of the trademark claim, but not
necessarily for the copyright claim. This factor may lead to the plaintiff winning the
trademark claim but losing the copyright claim. See Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods.,
No. C78-679A, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17722 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 24, 1981) (finding that
when defendant parodied Pillsbury’s characters in a sexual manner in their magazine,
plaintiffs sustained the burden of proof for their state “anti-dilution” claim but failed to
sustain their burden on their copyright claim).
151 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
152 See infra Section IV.B.2.
146

147
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1. The Sexual Character of a Work Fits Within the
First Prong of the Balancing Test
The first prong of the fair use balancing test states that
courts should consider “the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes.”153 The purpose and character
factor includes an inquiry into the work’s type, transformative
nature, purpose,154 and commerciality, but as always, this is not
an exhaustive list. A work’s commercial purpose is not
determinative,155 but commerciality can and should be considered.
One scholar notes that a “defendant’s active marketing of the
plaintiff’s work, such as the use of the copyrighted material on
the cover of a larger work to attract buyers, should be considered
more commercial than [its use in] . . . an article or photograph
included within a magazine.”156 GQ’s use of C-3PO on its cover
would fall under this heightened commercial purpose of the
infringing use. Using the beloved Star Wars characters on the
cover was clearly a tactic to elicit sales of the magazine based
on the attention GQ knew the issue would draw.
While the first prong’s commerciality factor has received
much attention, courts have included other factors in their firstprong analyses. For example, courts have considered the “user’s
bad faith, distortion of the copyright owner’s work, . . . the user’s
interest in responding to a personal attack,” as well as more
general considerations including public interest, the First
Amendment, and privacy concerns.157 The broad use of the word
“character” allows for the flexibility Congress intended. In the
legal sense, “character” is usually defined in terms of people’s
morals and behavior,158 but this common emphasis on morality
can logically be carried over into considering the sexual
character of a work, in addition to the broad general definitions
of the word. Definitions of “character” include “a feature used
to separate distinguishable things into categories” and “main or
essential nature especially as strongly marked and serving to
distinguish.”159 Under any of the definitions of “character,” a
17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012).
See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 54547, 561-63 (1985).
155 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994); see Patry &
Perlmutter, supra note 85, at 677-80.
156 Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 85, at 681.
157 Id. at 685 (citations omitted).
158 Character, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
159 Character, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2012).
153

154
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work’s sexual nature is a permissible attribute for consideration,
whether analyzing its moral aspects or distinguishable features.
When considering “purpose and character,” courts should give
attention to the “degree of social benefit fostered by that type of
[sexual] use,”160 in addition to determining whether the use is for
entertainment, scholarship, or commercial gain.
2. Legal Theories Regarding Sexual Content in
Intellectual Property and First Amendment
Jurisprudence
The sexual nature of content is not a new consideration
for courts or lawmaking bodies. Those advocating for more
liberal views of women’s sexuality have heralded the benefits of
expressing sexuality, while those concerned with the well-being of
sensitive audiences have warned against the harms of explicit
content. At common law, many original works were denied the
protection of intellectual property laws when the nature of the
work was sexual.161 Similarly, in intellectual property law and
related fields, protection of sexual content has often been denied.
For example, in order to be registered as a federal trademark, a
mark cannot consist of or be comprised of “immoral” or
“scandalous” material.162 The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
has used an “offensiveness” standard to determine that immoral
or scandalous material is material that is “shocking to the sense
of propriety, offensive to the conscience or moral feelings or
calling out for condemnation,” or is simply vulgar.163 Marks
referring to sex are often deemed to be scandalous and are
therefore ineligible for trademark protection.164
Fair use of copyrighted material developed as a doctrine
to balance an artist’s right to ownership of his creations with a
secondary user’s First Amendment right to freedom of speech.
Sexual, lewd, or obscene speech, however, is not fully protected
by the First Amendment, and in some instances is not protected
at all. It has long been held that obscene speech, including
pornographic material, “is not protected by the freedoms of speech
and press.”165 Speech is obscene if an average person viewing the
Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 85, at 681.
Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex Exceptionalism in Intellectual Property, 23 STAN.
L. & POL’Y REV 119, 119-20 (2012).
162 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012).
163 U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. TRADEMARK MANUAL OF
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1203.01 (2015).
164 See In re Boulevard Entm’t, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
165 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957).
160

161
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work in light of contemporary community standards would find
that the work (1) “appeals to the prurient interest,” (2) “depicts
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by . . . law,” and (3) “lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.”166 The Supreme Court has
wrestled with the amount of protection to grant nonobscene,
sexually explicit speech and has found that this type of speech
may deserve some First Amendment protection,167 but not as
much as political speech.168
Therefore, if a parody is obscene, it lacks First Amendment
protection, and thus the original artist’s exclusive right to his
copyrighted work has no other competing right to be balanced
against. In these instances, the parody defense must fail. Since
the Supreme Court has been able to clearly articulate and follow
guidelines to determine whether content is obscene,169 those same
considerations can and should be used in copyright cases to
determine how strong the copier’s competing rights are compared
to the original artist’s section 106 rights.
3. Sexual Content and Trademark Dilution and
Tarnishment
The sexual nature of an infringing work claiming fair
use is considered in an area of law closely related to copyright:
trademark. As discussed in Part I, trademark protection differs
from copyright in that it protects the association a consumer
makes with both a good and the source of that good.170 The
emphasis is on the goodwill and reputation of the source, rather
than on the source itself. Federal trademark law, like copyright
law, includes fair use as a defense to infringement for similar
policy reasons. Trademark’s fair use statute differs from
copyright’s in that use is only fair if it refrains from diluting
the brand through either blurring171 or tarnishment.172 The

166 United States v. McCoy, 602 Fed. App’x. 501, 504 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24, 30, 93 (1973)).
167 Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REV. 297,
309 (1995).
168 See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976) (stating that
“few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war” to protect this sort of speech).
169 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 23-26.
170 See supra Section I.A.
171 Blurring occurs when the second user’s use of the original mark may cause
confusion as to ownership, and thus consumers may erroneously attribute the second
mark to the original source. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2012).
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secondary use’s sexual nature is taken into account, as it is
presumed that obscene or vulgar use may tarnish the brand.
But the vulgarity is weighed against whether the use would
actually result in brand harm or whether a reasonable
consumer would understand that the vulgarity is clearly not
attributable to the original source, thus avoiding confusion and
harm.173 Although trademark tarnishment analysis may have
its weaknesses, at least the obvious sexual nature and
potential for harm are recognized.174 It seems illogical that
courts and lawmaking bodies recognize that the sexual nature
of a copied work can cause harm to the original artist in one
area of intellectual property but do not explicitly recognize it as
a potential source of harm in a closely related field. The refusal
to recognize the sexual nature of a copied work in copyright fair
use analysis leads to inconsistencies within individual cases
where the owner of the work loses on the copyright claim but
wins on the trademark claim.175
4. Courts’ Current Analyses of Sexual Parodies
Although parody’s sexual nature is not a required
consideration in copyright infringement cases as it is in First
Amendment protection and trademark infringement cases, courts
often consider the issue anyway. Unfortunately, courts’ handling
of sexual and obscene content in the area of parody has been
inconsistent. On one hand, some courts almost equate sexuality
with transformative parody and therefore put less emphasis on
the other four balancing factors of fair use,176 while other courts
172 Tarnishment occurs when the second user’s use of the original mark causes
an “association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous
mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark.” Id. § 1125(c)(2)(C).
173 See Girl Scouts of U.S. v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228,
1230-31, 1233 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (holding that a poster of a pregnant Girl Scout and
tagline “Be Prepared” was fair use because the content of the poster was clearly not
attributable to the Girl Scouts organization).
174 Compare Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901-02, 907 (9th
Cir. 2002) (finding that Aqua’s use of “Barbie” in its popular song, which called the doll
a “blond bimbo girl” and focused on sexuality, was a clear parodic use), with Dall.
Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 203, 205 (2d Cir.
1979) (enjoining defendant from using Dallas Cowboys Cheerleader uniforms on
topless women in its film, because it would likely tarnish the brand and was likely that
the public would erroneously assume plaintiff approved the use).
175 See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., No. C78-679A, 1981 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17722, at *8, *11 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 24, 1981).
176 Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Grp., Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897 (N.D. Cal.
2002); Berlin v. E.C. Publ’ns, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964); Rebecca Tushnet, My
Fair Ladies: Sex, Gender, and Fair Use in Copyright, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y
& L. 273, 274 (2007).
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show disdain for the lewd nature of the work and find it
infringing.177 Some critics argue that the fair use doctrine as it
stands grants courts too much freedom to censor material they
find to be distasteful or offensive,178 but Congress intended to
give courts this type of freedom.179 Prior to the 1976 amendment
to the Copyright Act, courts had been deciding fair use cases on
the basis of sexual obscenity180 and commercial use.181 The
amendment and legislative history are silent on the treatment of
sexuality when considering fair use, but they clearly express that
the commercial nature of a work is only one element to
consider.182 Thus, if Congress had a problem with the way courts
were balancing the sexual nature of parody, it could have
redirected them when it codified the fair use doctrine, but instead
it encouraged them to continue to develop the doctrine just as
they had been.
5. Not Evaluating the Sexual Nature of a Work Creates
Inconsistencies Within Individual Cases
Often, many works that are copyrighted are also
trademarked and have become so synonymous with the source of
the work that the consumer associates the good with the source.
This is likely to happen with many of Disney’s marks like Mickey
Mouse and C-3PO. The public recognizes these as copyrighted
works that cannot be reproduced and associates them both
consciously and subconsciously with Disney.183 While the sexually
explicit or suggestive nature of a parody has been considered an
important factor in the fairness of trademark parody,184 it is not
expressly recognized in copyright law. It seems that the law as it
stands may allow GQ’s Star Wars parody under fair use of
See, e.g., MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981).
See Paul Tager Lehr, Note, The Fair-Use Doctrine Before and After “Pretty
Woman’s” Unworkable Framework: The Adjustable Tool for Censoring Distasteful
Parody, 46 FLA. L. REV. 443, 446-47 (1994).
179 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976) (“Beyond a very broad statutory
explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must
be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis. Section
107 is intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change,
narrow, or enlarge it in any way.”).
180 See MCA, Inc., 677 F.2d at 185; Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d
751, 753 (9th Cir. 1978); Walt Disney Prods. v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp.
1397, 1397-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see also supra Section II.B.
181 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994).
182 H.R. Rep. No 94-1476, at 65 (1976).
183 See supra Section I.C for a discussion of the consumer confusion that
resulted from GQ’s use of the copyrighted Star Wars characters.
184 See supra Section IV.B.3.
177
178
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copyright but would prohibit the use of the Disney “D” or other
insignia on sexually suggestive material. The GQ cover is a more
provocative and noticeable use of Disney’s intellectual property
than a small insignia on the bottom corner of a sexually
suggestive magazine. The fact that the more subtle use of
Disney’s intellectual property would be illegal, yet the GQ cover is
not, seems unbalanced and inconsistent. If Disney were to bring
both trademark185 and copyright claims against GQ for the use of
its characters, its trademark claim would probably succeed,
and its copyright claim would probably fail.186
C.

Balancing Competing Rights and Potential Harms
Under Copyright Law

Including sexuality in the fair use balancing test would
allow courts to take a closer look at the type of parody when
determining how much protection the secondary use should be
afforded. Courts’ consideration of the sexuality of material in
First Amendment and other intellectual property issues
highlights how practical and plausible this solution is. Implicit
in courts’ evaluation of the sexual nature of content187 is the
idea that the court is protecting against harm.188 The fourth
factor in the current balancing test is “the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work”—in other words, the harm or potential harm to the
market.189 This prong takes into account not only harm that the
parody would cause to the market but also “whether unrestricted
and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant
. . . would result in a substantially adverse impact on the
potential market”190 and “the market for derivative works.”191
As discussed in Fisher v. Dees, the fourth prong seeks to
distinguish between an infringing work that “suppresses demand”
185 C-3PO and Princess Leia, along with several of the other Star Wars
characters, are registered trademarks. Trademark Electronic Search System (TESS),
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://tmsearch.uspto.gov/ [http://perma.c
c/U8Z9-S95R] (last visited July 16, 2016) (search “C-3PO” and “Princess Leia”).
186 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
187 This is true whether courts’ evaluation of the content’s sexual nature
occurs as it currently does in trademark and First Amendment issues, or if the sexual
nature is eventually evaluated in copyright.
188 See Shaman, supra note 167 (arguing that some speech receives less First
Amendment protection not because it has a low value to society but because it does in
fact cause harm).
189 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012).
190 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (quoting
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 (A)(4)).
191 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985).
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for the original in the market and one that “usurps” the original’s
spot in the market.192 Generally, when a work is copied
identically, courts find it clear that the copy may take the place
of the original in the market.193 But when something is
parodied, it is generally considered transformative,194 and thus
the parody is not “usurping” the original’s place in the market.
Viewing market harm in this way almost entirely removes the
fourth prong from the parody analysis195 and eliminates the
consideration of whether the “unrestricted conduct” has a
“substantially adverse impact” on the market. Although the
parody may not be putting itself in the place of the original on
the shelves, the harm done to the original may allow
competitors to hold that spot.196 The harm to the original in the
market is likely to be greater when the nature of the parody is
sexual and the original’s target audience is children. Because
the potential for greater harm exists depending on the
original’s target audience, market demographics should be
considered within the market prong.197
1. Existing Protections Against Harm to Juveniles
Congress was clear in the Copyright Act Amendment of
1976 that fair use is about balancing competing rights and
interests,198 and another area of clear interest for courts and
legislatures is protecting juveniles from harm, particularly

Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986).
See Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338
F.3d 127, 136 (2d Cir. 2003).
194 See Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir.
2003); Berlin v. E.C. Publ’ns, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964).
195 For something to be a parody, it will have to have the transformative
component, and thus it is likely that the copy will be targeting a new audience. For
example, in Lucasfilm, the court felt that Star Wars would not aim to exploit the
pornographic film market that the parody did, and in Campbell, the Court concluded that
2 Live Crew’s rap version of the song was targeting a new market for rap music that
would not harm plaintiff ’ s current target market. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994); see Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Grp., Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d
897, 901 (N.D. Cal. 2002); cf. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109
F.3d 1394, 1403 (9th Cir. 1997).
196 See David Fagundes, Market Harm, Market Help, and Fair Use, 17 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 359, 361-62 (2014) (discussing the type of market harm that fair use seeks
to avoid and suggesting that perhaps a net effect market-harm approach would provide a
more accurate and economically efficient reading of this prong).
197 Alternatively, the target demographic of the original and the potential for
resulting harm to others could be weighed as a fifth factor entirely. “Flexibility and
sensitivity are essential to [fair use’s] successful functioning.” Patry & Perlmutter, supra
note 85, at 668.
198 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976).
192

193
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harm of a sexual nature.199 Beyond the statutes and regulations
that protect children from direct harm,200 there exists a body of
law that regulates juveniles’ exposure to sexually explicit, lewd, or
obscene material. This priority to protect juveniles is often
balanced against the First Amendment right to free speech and,
in many cases, the protection of juveniles prevails. In Ginsberg v.
New York, the Supreme Court upheld a New York statute
banning the sale of sexually oriented material to minors, even
though the material in question was entitled to First Amendment
protection with respect to adults.201 In Bethel School District v.
Fraser, the Supreme Court held that a public school has a right to
censor lewd and vulgar speech that occurs on school grounds.202
Part of the Court’s analysis was its consideration of the children’s
presence in public schools and the acknowledgement that “First
Amendment jurisprudence recognizes an interest in protecting
minors from exposure to vulgar and offensive spoken language.”203
These examples illustrate the importance of considering the harm
to minors when balancing First Amendment rights and other
competing interests.
2. Regulation of Obscene, Lewd, and Vulgar Content
The interest in protecting minors not just from sexual
content, but also from content that is vulgar and offensive, is seen
most prominently in movie, radio, and television regulations. The
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) was founded in
1922 in response to a desire for the government to censor
American films.204 The MPAA does not censor content, but instead
balances artists’ free speech rights with the public’s desire to
know what type of content it will be watching. The MPAA is
199 Some of the most obvious statutory protections that come to mind include strict
criminal liability for statutory rape, molestation, and child endangerment.
200 See Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-690, 102 Stat. 4485 (1988) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2252 (2012));
see also Sexual Exploitation of Children Act. Pub. L. No. 95-222, 92 Stat. 7 (1977)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (2012)).
201 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
202 Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (“A high school
assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit monologue directed towards an
unsuspecting audience of teenage students.”). The Court held that it was an
appropriate function of public schools to determine what manner of speech is
inappropriate and to thus prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms on school
grounds. Id. at 685-86.
203 See id. at 676; FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Ginsberg, 390
U.S. 629.
204 Our Story, MPAA, http://www.mpaa.org/our-story [http://perma.cc/652F3QNQ] (last visited June 28, 2016).
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responsible for providing a rating system for movies and
television shows, evaluating films and shows against this rating
system, and assigning a rating grade “G” through “NC-17”
depending on components such as vulgarity, violence, and sexual
content.205 Although the MPAA rates this content, this is not
enforced by law and instead functions as a code that movies and
theaters follow, which highlights the importance that society
places on such a rating system and the transparency of content.
Similarly, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) has the power to regulate indecent and obscene television
and radio broadcasts, but unlike the MPAA, this administrative
agency has the power to legally enforce its regulations.206 In FCC
v. Pacifica Foundation, the FCC defined “indecent” in response to
a radio broadcast by George Carlin that featured a monologue
about “Seven Words You Can Never Say on Television.”207 The
FCC defined indecent language as language or material that
depicts or “describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium,
sexual or excretory activities and organs.”208 The crux of this case
was not so much the language Carlin used, but that he used it in
a broadcast during a time in which many children would be
listening.209 This led to a movement toward creating “safe-harbor”
hours on television and radio during which the FCC could more
closely regulate content, due to the likelihood that children would
be exposed to it. The Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2005
prohibits indecent language between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and
10:00 p.m.210 Under this Act, the FCC is able to fine broadcasters
who use indecent language or images during the safe-harbor
hours, even if the use of the language is only “fleeting.”211 The Act
was signed in 2005, following two instances that contributed to
the Act’s passage: Bono’s utterance of “this is really, really
205 Film Ratings, MPAA, http://www.mpaa.org/film-ratings/ [http://perma.cc/599
N-FRQN] (last visited June 28, 2016).
206 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2012) (“Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane
language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than two years, or both.”); About the FCC, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/about/
overview [http://perma.cc/J9RR-NCBS] (last visited June 28, 2016).
207 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 751 (1978) (appendix).
208 Id. at 732.
209 Id. (“[T]he Commission concluded that certain words depicted sexual and
excretory activities in a patently offensive manner, [and] noted that they ‘were
broadcast at a time when children were undoubtedly in the audience.’” (quoting 56
F.C.C.2d 94, 99 (1975))).
210 47 U.S.C. § 609 (2012).
211 Id. One single utterance of the “F word” is enough for a fine to be imposed.
19 F.C.C.R. 4975 (2004), 2004 WL 540339.
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fucking brilliant” as he accepted a Golden Globe award,212 and
the infamous Janet Jackson wardrobe malfunction during the
2004 Super Bowl halftime show.213 Both of these instances were
fleeting and unplanned, yet they provoked a public outcry and
resulted in stricter regulations and fines, showing just how
important the policy of protecting minor audiences from
indecent and obscene material is.214
It seems that even where minors are only part of the
audience, protecting them from inappropriate material is a high
priority. As such, when considering the harm a parody may do to
the market, courts should consider the overall harmful effect that
takes into account the typical audience member. By including the
audience demographics, courts will be able to more accurately
balance the competing rights of the parties while furthering other
goals. The right to display sexual content without regard for the
presence of children should not be given more weight than the
right of a copyright owner to his material.215
CONCLUSION
As Congress and the courts have emphasized multiple
times, determining whether a use of a copyrighted work is fair
involves balancing the copyright owner’s right to control his
creations with the copier’s right to fair use and freedom of
expression. Examining the history of fair use and parody in
copyright law, however, reveals that the current balancing test
supports laziness and outright copying, due to the test’s
inconsistent application and courts’ failure to consider additional
factors. Much of the fair use jurisprudence focuses on balancing,
which begs the question: Does a balance truly exist where a
212 In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their
Airing of the “Golden Globe Awards” Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4980 & n.4 (2004).
213 See Press Release, FCC, FCC Chairman Powell Calls Super Bowl Halftime
Show a “Classless, Crass, Deplorable Stunt.” Opens Investigation (Feb. 2, 2004), 2004
WL 187406.
214 See Lili Levi, The FCC’s Regulation of Indecency, 7 FIRST AMENDMENT
CENTER 1 (Apr. 2008); see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 52930 (2009) (“The Commission could reasonably conclude that the pervasiveness of foul
language, and the coarsening of public entertainment in other media such as cable, justify
more stringent regulation of broadcast programs so as to give conscientious parents a
relatively safe haven for their children.”).
215 In the case of the GQ cover with C-3PO’s finger in Amy Schumer’s mouth, the
fact that this provocative image appears on the cover of a widely distributed magazine
makes it highly likely that children will see this image due to its level of exposure and the
visibility of the Star Wars character. If the cover attracted a child enough that he would look
through the magazine for more Star Wars pictures, he would encounter a naked woman in
bed with some of his favorite characters—a confusing image indeed.
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media mogul like Condé Nast is allowed to portray in a sexual
manner copyrighted characters that typically appeal to a juvenile
audience? As the law currently stands, this type of copying for
massive profit, despite a high likelihood of confusion as to
authorization and attribution, is permitted.
The GQ August 2015 cover featuring a provocative image
of Amy Schumer with C-3PO created much outrage, leaving
Disney to defend itself publicly but with no recourse privately. If
the fair use balancing test included an examination of the sexual
nature of the copy (as other areas of First Amendment and
intellectual property law do), in addition to the commercial nature
of the copy under the “purpose and character” prong of the test,
this first factor would weigh against fair use. Similarly, if the
fourth prong, which considers market harm, considered the
demographic of the market more generally to take into account
net harm to others (particularly harm to juveniles, which the
legislature and courts deem important to protect against in other
related areas), this fourth factor would also weigh against fair
use. On balance, the test would become more predictable, and
Disney (and others similarly situated) would be more likely to
prevail in a copyright infringement suit. The current
inconsistency and lack of additional protection in the test is
enough to prevent a massive corporation like Disney from
stopping the abuse of its characters. More concerning is the
logical conclusion that if a powerful company like Disney cannot
fight off plagiarizers, then a less powerful copyright owner
certainly cannot. With technology improving rapidly and peer-topeer marketplaces like Amazon and eBay becoming more popular,
the ability to “parody” copyrighted works is increasing. Congress’s
1976 amendment to the Copyright Act left it flexible enough to
respond to changing technology. To curb the trend of sexualizing
copyrighted material for profit, the fair use test needs to be
strengthened—before coloring books contain images of C-3PO at a
brothel and Darth Vader pole-dancing.
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